Toronto Sun Columnist: Eric Margolis Whatever happens we have got


the Maxim gun and they have not.

The Post Saddam Quagmire

Turkey, Iran set sights on Northern Iraq

"Ancient History": U.S. Conduct in the Middle East Since World War Il and the Folly Of Intervention

My friend, Sheldon Richman, wrote this essay in 1999 for the Cato Institute. Nothing seems to change but the political party in charge of the hubris.

Here is a piece of it:

The importance of the de facto alliance between the United States and Iraq, which continued until shortly before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, cannot be overstated. By siding with Iraq against Iran, the United States granted legitimacy to Saddam Hussein as the world's guardian against Muslim fanaticism. His use of chemical weapons against Iran brought the mildest criticism because of who his victims were.(211) Moreover, the various forms of aid had a direct effect on Iraq's ability to hold out against Iran's long onslaught. At the end of the war, Saddam had a huge military establishment and believed that he was the savior of the Arab world. When Kuwait refused to forgive the large debt Saddam owed, he concluded that the Kuwaitis were ungrateful free riders who had taken him for granted. That conclusion explains, in part, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.(212)

It is sobering to realize that some foreign policy experts urged Washington to support Saddam Hussein during the war against Iran on the grounds that an Iraqi victory was preferable to an Iranian one. Daniel Pipes and Laurie Mylroie, for example, wrote that "the fall of the existing regime in Iraq would enormously enhance Iranian influence, endanger the supply of oil, threaten pro-American regimes throughout the area, and upset the Arab-Israeli balance." They favored "other economic steps" to help Iraq in addition to the commodity and Ex-Im Bank credits. "Such measures," they wrote, "would assert U.S. confidence in Iraq's political viability and its ability to repay its debts after the war's end, and would encourage other countries--especially Iraq's Arab allies and European creditors--to continue financing Iraqi war efforts."(213)

Pipes and Mylroie anticipated the argument that a triumphant Saddam Hussein would be bad for American interests and responded:

But the Iranian revolution and seven years of bloody and inconclusive warfare have changed Iraq's view of its Arab neighbors, the United States, and even Israel. . . . Its leaders no longer consider the Palestinian issue their problem. [Its] allies have forced a degree of moderation on Iraq. . . . Iraq is now the de facto protector of the regional status quo.(214)

The consequences that Pipes and Mylroie feared from an Iranian victory have come as a result of Washington's backing Iraq. That typical backfire is not simply a hazard of foreign policymaking. It is inherent in the nature of war and lesser state conflict, in which the law of unintended consequences rules. Sheer hubris alone permits so-called experts to make pronouncements about how distant peoples' affairs should be managed and with exactly how much force.(215)

Unfortunately, the fresh example of the Iran-Iraq War has not deterred either the policymakers or their expert allies in the private sector. As if their support for Iraq had been a resounding success, they embraced Syria's Hafez Assad and Iran in the conflict with Iraq, blind to what effects that may have in coming years.

The New Gulf War

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, underscored more than one irony of prior U.S. policy. U.S. aid to Saddam during his eight-year war with Iran is only one of those ironies.(216) Another is that although President Bush emphatically rejected Saddam's attempt to link the invasion to the plight of the Palestinians, Bush may yet face enormous Arab pressure to address that problem.

Bush offered several reasons for his response to Saddam's actions, a response that included the cobbling of an international coalition of nations. The initial military deployment was to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. Then, ostensibly to drive Iraq from Kuwait, Bush went to the United Nations to have an economic blockade, an act of war, imposed, although American ships were already in place. Vowing to usher in a "new world order," Bush declared that, in the first test of the post-cold-war world, unprovoked aggression and the toppling of a "legitimate" government (read: quasi-feudal monarchy) by a tyrant comparable to Hitler could not be tolerated. The Munich analogy was rolled out more than once. Although American intervention was lightly shrouded in the mantle of the United Nations and collective security, Bush made it clear that no country but the United States could have spearheaded the effort. Bush and other public officials, including Secretary Baker and Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, raised the less lofty issue of oil and the purported danger to the U.S. economy ("our way of life"), although that argument had been discredited early in the crisis.(217) When the specter of Iraq's controlling 40 percent of the proven oil reserves did not spook the American public, President Bush insisted that the intervention was not about oil but about aggression. He also defended his policy in terms of protecting the Americans held hostage by Saddam Hussein, although they were not taken hostage until after the policy was launched, and of the economic damage being inflicted on the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe, although the rise in oil prices resulted from Bush's own embargo.

Two days after the November election, the president announced a doubling of the military deployment to provide an "offensive option." Faith in the blockade was abandoned. On Thanksgiving Day 1990 Bush added a new justification of the possible need for war: Saddam's apparent effort to develop nuclear weapons, which, Bush implied, would endanger the American people. The speech followed by days the publication of a New York Times opinion poll in which a majority of respondents had said that a nuclear threat was the one reason they would be willing to support military action against Iraq. Thus, in faithful Orwellian 1984 fashion, the official U.S. attitude toward a recent ally turned 180 degrees.

The hollowness of the Bush administration's reasons, particularly the highly selective stand against aggression, indicates that the president sees the Middle East as his predecessors saw it, as a U.S. sphere of influence in which rival interests may not compete. Saddam's offense did not lie in occupying a neighbor (partners Turkey, Syria, China, and the Soviet Union, as well as Israel, had done that), or in murdering "his own people" (China's leaders and Syria's Hafez Assad had done that), or in having nuclear weapons (several unsavory states have them and more are in the process of acquiring arsenals). Rather, his offense lay in upsetting the status quo in an area where the United States had vowed repeatedly to go to war, if necessary, to prevent adverse change. Bush's policy was a reaffirmation of U.S. claims in the Middle East, in case anyone thought that the end of the cold war made them obsolete. As he put it, the lesson of the war against Iraq is that "what we say goes."(218) Related reasons for the policy include the need for a new mission for a defense establishment threatened by the public's demands for a peace dividend; the desire to test new weapons; and the need to distract the public from troubling domestic issues, such as the exploding budget deficit and higher taxes.

One outcome of U.S. intervention has been immense Arab pressure on the United States to settle the Palestinian question, something that worries Israel. Bush's Arab coalition partners have a strong case when they argue that the United States cannot justify its double standard for Iraq and Israel. Unfortunately, few in the region will argue that Bush should disengage and let the parties solve the problem themselves. At best, Arab pressure may prompt him to change the nuances of U.S. intervention, but it is doubtful Bush will be willing or able to try to change the Shamir government's position on the occupied territories. Israel, for one thing, managed to rehabilitate its public image in the United States by its decision to stay out of the war.

The war against Iraq, though executed quickly and with light American casualties (let's not forget the death and destruction inflicted on Iraq), will have continuing unfortunate consequences, besides the massacre of Kurds and Shi'ites at Saddam's hands. It was a grotesquely logical denouement to 45 years of U.S. policy in the Middle East.(219)

Bush's real goal in Iraq

Pax Americana -- we ain't leaving Iraq.

One Last Time: The Case Against a War With Iraq

Is Bush Nuts? War as Religion

Conservative columnist, Georgie Anne Geyer, no neoconservative her, raises the ultimate question: Has GWB gone off the deep end? I suspect there is also a bad case of Foggy Bottom Hubris to explain the unfathomable attitude of the administration.

Euro touches fresh four-year highs

Dollar continues to fall.

Playing Texas poker, Bush bets all on Iraq
Bob Novak

WorldNetDaily: Why the French behave as they do Pat Buchanan writes on the French experience.

Why War with Iraq? Follow the Money

The Dollar vs. the Euro? Here is an interesting angle: Iraq in recent months decided to contract for future delivery of its oil in euros, not dolllars. The fiat American dollar greenback serves as the world's reserve currency, essentially since Bretton Woods and more particularly since 1971, and its acceptance gives the U.S. a free ride in a variety of ways. The euro is the creature of Germany's conservative central bank and the european common market (sans the United Kingdom) and -- in theory at least -- contends to serve the same purpose as the dollar as a reserve currency. The last time the Arab world rejected the dollar as the standard for the pricing of oil was about 1974 when it noticed that the dollar had depreciated violently against gold. The result was not pretty and probably cost Gerald Ford the 1976 election.

"The Emperors of Ice Cream" -- Donald Luskin on FTC & Ice Cream on NRO Financial

When the FTC's annoucement hit the news I had a similar reaction to Don. As the old antitrust regulation saying goes: "You let me define the market and I can find a level of concentration which needs a remedy or at least 'strict scrutiny'." Here we have a market defined as the market for "superpremium ice cream"? Where is the dissenting opinion tearing this decision apart?

Billionaire Soros blasts Bush, calls on President to honor world opinion

Soros gets one call right, although I have not noticed Soros supporting small "r" republicanism much lately.

The Costs and Madness of Empire

Comments on the "managerial state" as it applies to the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq.

Gods, Generals, and Tariffs

Tom DiLorenzo shows how it was the fear that a free-trading South would undermine the protectionist interests of the Northern manufacturers -- who bankrolled the Republican Party -- which led to Lincoln's decision to wage war on the southern states.

'Eenie, meenie, minie, moe

Pick a seat, we gotta go.

Five Books That Explain It All

Jeffrey Tucker of the Mises Institute suggests five books which, taken together, explain the state of today's world. Excellent suggestions all. They are all in my library should anyone in the local area care to borrow them.

Statement by Jule R. Herbert Jr., President of the National Taxpayers Legal Fund (in 1984, that is)

Found on the internet: 1984 testimony of yours truly before a Senate Finance subcommittee on a "taxpayer bill of rights" proposal -- which passed in some form, as I recall. But the important point was concerning the tax system itself:

"Of course, changing a few procedural rules about the tax collection process is just a beginning. For example, it is no longer possible to deny that the problems of the U.S. economy over the last several decades were caused in substantial part by the tax system. The fact that this system has a pervasive institutional bias against saving, capital formation, work incentives, and relative price coordination seems to be generally recognized. Certainly the positive reforms which were passed in 1981 (especially tax rate indexing and the reduction of the marginal rates) could not have passed in the intellectual climate of just a few years earlier. That more was not done in 1981 was not because the advantages of easing the constraints imposed by the tax system on the market economy were not seen by many, but because there has been little progress in linking tax reform to necessary reforms of government spending.

I would argue that the cost of runaway government spending is much greater than the amount of resources which are thus taxed, borrowed, or taken from the American people through the insidious process of inflation. Its growing drain on the ability of government to conduct itself in a rational manner not only presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to needed tax reform, but in addition entails negative "nonfiscal" effects on the social structure, damaging thereby the market economy and, indeed, the very prospects for a stable political order.

The whole ethos which provides the justification for work, saving, voluntary exchange, and property rights is undermined as government spending expands without apparent constraint. If groups can simply "vote" themselves increasingly larger shares of the community's wealth, then the effectiveness of free-market institutions for the production of wealth becomes problematical."

This is great stuff, back when I was profound and very nuanced.

The Trouble with Deficit Finance

Roger Garrison, Professor of Economics at Auburn, takes a look at the run-away deficit:

Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the White House budget director, is reported as claiming that the current deficit, "representing 2.7 percent of the nation's gross domestic product, was not large enough in percentage terms to cause trouble or to raise interest rates...."

Didn't Everett Dirksen used to say that the main purpose of GDP (GNP in his day) was to make everything else look small by comparison?

Even at that, Mr. Daniels made the deficit look a little smaller than it actually is. His 2.7 percent suggests a GDP of about $11,300 billion. The readily available Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) provided by the St. Louis Fed shows that current GDP is closer to $10,300 billion, making the $304 billion deficit equal to 2.95 percent.

More to the point, GDP makes for a politically attractive but economically irrelevant denominator. How much is government borrowing relative to the funds available for borrowing? The relevant denominator is total saving and not total output. FRED shows the current annual rate of gross saving to be $1,574 billion. And the government is borrowing just under 20 percent of it. Does Mr. Daniels believe that this percentage is not large enough to cause trouble or to raise interest rates? And if so, just what percentage would be large enough?

Jurors in pot case decry their own verdict

Federal prosecutors and court keep evidence away from the jury in a medical marijuana prosecution in California. Defendant was actually working for the City of Oakland. Malum prohibitum prosecutions enforcing sumptuary laws should not have the same standing to bar the truth from the jury as a malum in se prosecution. And the appeal courts know that.